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Lulism is one of the most important political phenomena of twenty-first-century 
Brazil. It can be compared to the Varguism that dominated Brazilian politics between 1930 
and 1964 in its broad popular but politically unorganized base and its policy of state 
intervention in the economy to stimulate economic growth, increase the state’s room for 
maneuver against the imperialist countries, and promote a moderate income distribution. 
These two variants of populism differ, however, in that Varguism was based on the work-
ing class while Lulism, which may be called “neopopulism,” is based on the marginal mass 
of workers and has less potential to destabilize the political process. Bonapartism, to which 
Lulism has also been compared, is distinct from it in that what links its leadership to its 
base is the fetish of the state based on order rather than the fetish based on protection.
O lulismo é um dos fenômenos políticos mais importantes do Brasil do século XXI. 
Pode ser comparado ao varguismo que dominou a política brasileira entre 1930 e 1964 em 
relação à sua ampla, mas politicamente desorganizada, base popular, e sua política de 
intervenção estatal na economia para estimular o crescimento econômico, aumentar a 
margem de manobra do Estado contra os países imperialistas e promover uma distribuição 
de renda moderada. Essas duas variantes do populismo diferem, no entanto, no sentido de 
que o varguismo era baseado na classe trabalhadora, enquanto o lulismo, que pode ser 
chamado de “neopopulismo”, é baseado na massa marginal de trabalhadores e tem menos 
potencial para desestabilizar o processo político. O bonapartismo, ao qual o lulismo tam-
bém foi comparado, é distinto dele, pois o que liga sua liderança à sua base é o fetiche do 
estado baseado na ordem, e não o fetiche baseado na proteção.
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Lulism is one of Brazil’s most important twenty-first-century political phe-
nomena. It can be compared to the Vargas movement that dominated Brazilian 
politics between 1930 and 1964. Both phenomena have broad popular bases 
that are not politically organized, and both have implemented policies of state 
intervention in the economy to stimulate economic growth, increase the state’s 
room for maneuver against imperialist countries, and promote a moderate 
income distribution. Some analysts and observers of Brazilian politics have 
characterized Lulism as a new variant of Brazilian populism,1 and André Singer 
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(2012) and others have introduced a new element into the discussion by char-
acterizing it as a variant of Bonapartism.
In this article I want to show, first, why it is correct to characterize Lulism as 
populism and, more precisely, neopopulism. A warning is important at the 
outset. Lulism is not confined to Lula’s political leadership. Populism depends 
exclusively on the image of the leader only when it first appears and in a deeper 
sense transcends the image of the leader. Overlooking this fact, many were 
surprised by the election and subsequent reelection of Dilma Rousseff, believ-
ing that the charisma to which they mistakenly attributed Lula’s leadership 
was personal and not transferable. Secondly, I want to point to the error of 
characterizing Lulism as a kind of Bonapartism. Finally, I will try to highlight 
the importance of the theoretical and political aspects of this discussion.
The ConCepTs
Much of contemporary Brazilian historiography has abandoned the concept 
of populism, including the historians who criticize the Vargas inheritance and 
some of those who defend it. However, it has resisted criticism and remains 
valid, and, more important, it is essential for understanding current Brazilian 
and Latin American politics. Scenes from Lula’s 2017 Caravan for Brazil, when 
the former president, persecuted and defamed by the judiciary and the media, 
was joyously received by the impoverished and politically disorganized masses 
in the Northeastern sertão (hinterland), should serve as a warning to those who 
have sought to banish the concept of populism from the historiography of 
republican Brazil. Throughout this essay I will make critical references to that 
historiography.
The concepts of populism and Bonapartism are both the subject of exten-
sive discussion in the social sciences, and it is often overlooked that both 
terms are polysemous. It is important here not to confuse, as linguists would 
say, the signifier with the signified. The signifier grama may mean “grass” or 
“gram”; the signifier manga may mean “mango” or “sleeve.” The signifiers 
“populism” and “Bonapartism” may also mean many things. What matters 
is how they are used—the concepts they “embrace.”2 The word “populism” 
in the discourse of liberal observers and analysts simply means “dema-
gogy”—unscrupulous leadership that deceives the uninformed masses. In 
the works of Weberians it means “charismatic leadership” arising from the 
personal and nontransferable attributes of the leader. Finally, in Marxist texts 
it means grassroots leadership that aspires to distribute income and, nourish-
ing illusions about the function of the state, is politically disorganized. Only 
in this last case is it proper to speak of populist ideology. Those who use con-
cepts of demagogic leaders and charismatic leaders (characterizations that, 
besides, may merge) understand populism as politics devoid of any ideology. 
In Brazilian intellectual life this type of analysis was conceived by the so-
called Itatiaia Group, a nucleus of Carioca intellectuals of the 1950s from 
which the former Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros of Rio de Janeiro 
emerged. In 1954 the group’s magazine Cadernos do Nosso Tempo published a 
pioneering article that became very influential in the analysis of Brazilian 
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populism entitled “What Is Adhemarism?” The answer to this question was 
that, unlike the bourgeois liberalism and workers’ socialism born in Europe, 
Adhemarism was not a class politics but a mass politics, devoid of ideology 
and under the tutelage of a charismatic leader.3 Therefore, in spite of their 
using the same term, the differences among analysts are extensive: some are 
speaking of demagogy, others of charisma, and still others of ideology.
Differences are also important in the area of political action, which, although 
different from theoretical analysis, is not unrelated to it. The liberal conception 
of populism characterizes a political phenomenon in the same act in which it 
exposes it and combats it from an elitist and antipopular viewpoint. The Marxist 
conception of populism, while acknowledging its progressive aspect (income 
distribution) and its conservative aspect (maintaining the masses in a state of 
political disorganization) can, depending on the situation, either provide criti-
cal support to populist leaders or oppose their actions. Further, in opposing 
those actions this populism aspires to the political organization of the masses 
rather than the elimination of their political participation, which is the goal of 
liberals. These theoretical and political differences between diverse concepts of 
populism often go unnoticed not only because the word used by different writ-
ers is the same one but also because the historical phenomena to which these 
writers are referring are also the same ones, based on the leadership of Getúlio 
Vargas, Leonel Brizola, Jânio Quadros, and others.
I define “populism” synthetically as the fetish of the protective state. The 
individualization or personalization of politics that is notable both in populism 
and in Bonapartism and actually transcends both, since to a greater or lesser 
degree it is present in all bourgeois or petty-bourgeois political orientations of 
capitalist society, is in this case a manifestation of a statist ideology. Reverence 
for the figure of the leader is reminiscent of the cult of the state institution.
The idea of a state fetish can be developed from Marx’s well-known anal-
ysis of the relation of the peasantry to Louis Bonaparte and the Second 
French Empire and from Lenin’s texts on the relation of the peasantry to the 
state. These texts describe, at least in practical terms, the idea of a state fetish 
(Lenin, 1975), and this idea is the common element of populism and 
Bonapartism. There is a formal similarity between the two. The peasantry, 
diluted by the individualism of the small landowner, cannot organize on its 
own and therefore tends to assign to the capitalist state—a formally univer-
salist institution open to the interests of all—the task of acting on its behalf 
and in its place. Waiting for state action, it remains politically disorganized. 
The notion of a fetish refers to the fact that the peasantry is unaware that the 
action of the state depends primarily on the political correlation of forces. On 
the contrary, it imagines that the state is a free and sovereign entity, and this 
allows it to attribute to the state conditions, forces, and capacities for action 
that often derive from the political action of the peasantry itself. The main 
source of the power of Louis Bonaparte was the electoral support of the peas-
antry, the majority class of the French population, and he depended on it for 
his election as a congressman and as president and in the successive plebi-
scites of the Second Empire. The phenomenon is of the same type as com-
modity fetishism. Just as the producer attributes to the commodity qualities 
that are the result of his own work, the peasant attributes to the state the 
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power that in fact comes from the political participation of the peasants 
themselves.4
As I have said, populism is the fetish of a particular type of state, one envi-
sioned as a protector. It is the adjective “protective” applied to state policy that 
differentiates populism from Bonapartism. The latter is the fetish of the state 
based on order. Formally similar, populism and Bonapartism differ in content. 
The workers who serve as the social basis for a populist relationship expect the 
state—this supposedly universalist, free, and sovereign entity—to take the ini-
tiative to protect them economically and socially. The workers, peasants or not, 
who are the basis of a Bonapartist relationship expect the state—which they 
also consider universalist, free, and sovereign—to take the initiative to impose 
social order even when it is threatened by disruptive and subversive forces.5 
The first expectation was fed by the workers who were the social base of 
Varguism and is fed by the workers who today are the social base of Lulism. 
The second expectation was fueled by the French peasants who expected from 
Bonaparte the elimination of the emerging labor movement in Paris, which 
they perceived as a threat to order and private property.
Varguism and LuLism
Brazil from the 1930s to the 1950s was very different from Brazil in the dec-
ades of 2000 and 2010. The objectives, social bases, and political methods of 
Varguism and Lulism are different, but they have common features. Explaining 
what they have in common and what distinguishes them will justify the use of 
the prefix “neo-” to refer to the variant of populism that Lulism represents.
The goal of Varguism was the capitalist industrialization of the country, 
using the young working class newly arrived from rural areas as a resource to 
be incorporated as part of the political game, although in a subordinate and 
controlled position. This young working class was strong enough to compel 
national policy to take it into account but insufficiently organized, which was 
what made it possible for Varguism to incorporate it in a controlled way. The 
opponents of Varguism were the bourgeois group that had been hegemonic 
between 1894 and 1930, the comprador bourgeoisie linked to exports and 
imports (Perissinotto, 1994); U.S. imperialism, which more than European 
imperialism was reluctant to accept Vargas’s industrialist policy; and the upper 
middle class. The comprador bourgeoisie and imperialism were the ruling 
forces of the former União Democrática Nacional (National Democratic 
Union—UDN) while the upper middle class was its social base. In seeking to 
conquer the interests assembled in the UDN, Vargas had the support of the 
young post-1930 working class, with a socioeconomic and political profile dis-
tinct from that of the workers of the Old Republic. This support was achieved 
through the expansion and consolidation of labor law. The control of this work-
ing class, which Vargas disputed with the old Brazilian Communist Party, was 
obtained mainly by establishing the state corporate union structure.
Having left the fields without any experience of organization and class 
struggle, workers were attracted by the demands made by the state (specifi-
cally, by the head of the executive branch). They became organized and struggled 
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but did so within the state union and failed to establish a mass labor party with 
its own political program (Boito, 1991). This was not, however, because, as 
modernization theory would have it, they were the bearers of a “traditional 
cultural background” that led them to personalize social and political relations. 
Rather, their willingness to respond to the political call of a modern, bureau-
cratic capitalist state represented a desire to overcome the ideology of personal 
subordination to the landowner.
Varguism, in contrast to Lulism, served as the basis for the organization of 
populist governments. Populism is politics, ideology, and, eventually, govern-
ment. These dimensions are present or absent in different periods and are coor-
dinated in a particular way. On the one hand, there may be a populist disposition 
in the popular classes without there being a leader or movement to catalyze it. 
In such periods the disposition remains dormant and may appear only spo-
radically in politically impotent manifestations such as breakthroughs that 
express popular dissatisfaction or through opinion surveys carried out both 
broadly and in depth. On the other hand, there may be a populist political 
movement such as Lula’s Caravan for Brazil without there being a populist 
government (the government of Michel Temer, was antipopular across the 
board), while a populist government is necessarily characterized by minimally 
meeting popular demands.
What interests me more here is that even if there is populist leadership at the 
head of government, this does not mean that that government can only be 
characterized as populist. The characterization of a government depends, basi-
cally, on the characterization of the bloc in power and not on its social base of 
support, which, by its nature, is excluded from state power.6 It is the bloc in 
power in the governments of Getúlio Vargas that allows us to characterize 
those governments as populist. In this bloc the state bureaucracy acted as an 
autonomous social force implementing a political development program of 
Brazilian capitalism that was not supported in its essentials by any of the bour-
geois groups that belonged to the bloc in power. This policy was actively and 
persistently resisted by the old comprador bourgeoisie, which had fallen from 
its hegemonic position of 1930, and while it was accepted by the internal bour-
geoisie (whose most important and most favored sector was industry) it was 
with many caveats, restrictions, and conflicts (Farias, 2017). What was happen-
ing in the period was, in fact, a protracted crisis of hegemony in the ruling bloc. 
It was this crisis and the fact that the head of the executive branch had popular 
support (albeit diffuse and inorganic, as is typical of populism) that made it 
possible for the state bureaucracy to acquire considerable room for maneuver 
in confronting the different bourgeois groups. In other words, although the 
Vargas governments were able to develop Brazilian capitalism and favored the 
interests of the bourgeoisie, especially the industrial one, they were not bour-
geois governments in the strict sense of the term.
While Lulism’s social bases, objectives, and enemies differed from those of 
Varguism in numerous respects, what was common to them was that their 
social bases aspired to state protection and did so for popular and progressive 
reasons: economic growth, income distribution, and, to a greater or lesser 
extent, a willingness to support the assertion of the rights of the Brazilian state 
against the imperialist powers. It is perhaps contrary to the perception of the 
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Brazilian left today that Varguism’s political ambition was greater than 
Lulism’s. It sought to reformulate the old international division of labor and 
industrialize the country, and to do so it had to break with the legality of the 
First Republic, use armed action to liquidate the hegemony of the old compra-
dor bourgeoisie in 1930, win a civil war in 1932, and change the entire political 
system of the country. Once in power, Varguism relied on a working class based 
on active unions with significant segments linked to a communist party that 
might have threatened the bourgeois order. The populist crises of 1954 and 1964 
were caused by the rise of the labor movement and, in the latter case, the peas-
ant movement, an uprising that went beyond the limits of populist politics. The 
support of this social base allowed populism to implant social and labor rights 
that to this day torment the Brazilian bourgeoisie. Rooting out Varguism from 
Brazilian politics required a coup d’état and the establishment of a military 
dictatorship that lasted two decades. Lulism arose in a different historical situ-
ation, related to the defense of the labor movement on domestic and interna-
tional levels, and it strives for less.
Its main social base is the marginal mass of workers (Boito, 2003), a base with 
less potential to destabilize the political process than that of Varguism. In 
speaking of the marginal mass of workers I mean those workers who, as is 
typical in dependent capitalist countries, cannot be part, in any relatively stable 
and lasting way, of strictly capitalist production, the production of merchan-
dise on the basis of wage labor (Kowarick, 1975; Nun, 2001; Pereira, 1971). This 
group is both large and heterogeneous, including part-time informal wage 
earners, impoverished segments of the peasant economy, self-employed urban 
workers, street vendors, workers in the informal labor market of personal and 
domestic service, the underemployed and chronically unemployed, and others. 
A detail that shows the complexity of the political game is that the social base 
of Getúlio Vargas, a professional politician and large-scale farmer, was the 
working class, while the social base of Lula da Silva, a professional politician 
and a metalworker, is workers of the marginal mass. Vargas spoke at Estádio 
São Januário and directed his speeches to the working class, while Lula orga-
nized his Caravan for Brazil in the Northeast and focused mainly on impover-
ished and disorganized workers rather than on the ABC of São Paulo from 
which he had emerged as a leader of workers.
For reasons different from those of the young post-1930 working class, 
workers in the marginal mass find it difficult to establish themselves as an 
autonomous social force—a party with its own political program. The het-
erogeneity and fragmentation of their working conditions and their limited 
capacity to exert pressure on capitalists or governments make them prone 
to populism. In the Brazil of Lulism, while the industrial working class lost 
economic and union influence, the number of workers of the marginal mass 
grew largely because of the existence of the neoliberal capitalist model. The 
political trajectory of Lula and of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ 
Party—PT) itself evidences a gradual displacement of its original social 
base, grounded in the new unionism that emerged in the metallurgical 
industry of the ABC of São Paulo in the late 1970s, by the marginal workers 
who are today the majority of the Brazilian population. The social policy of 
the PT governments was centered not in labor law and social rights but 
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rather in the politics of income transfers to the marginal mass. The estab-
lishment of labor rights did not even reach the members of this popula-
tion—except for domestic workers—and the government of Dilma Rousseff 
rightly reserved access for them to the labor rights enshrined in the 
Consolidation of Labor Laws.
Since Lulism is a variant of populism, it has not politically organized its 
social base, instead keeping it politically dispersed and disposed to cast its 
votes in favor of PT presidential candidates. Vargas, in contrast, created state 
unionism and the Brazilian Labor Party. Neither of these institutions aimed at 
overcoming populist statism. The state union operated and continues to oper-
ate today as a union apparatus attached to the state that gives it legitimacy 
through the provision of the union charter, a monopoly of representation 
based on the legal guarantee of union uniqueness, and the financial resources 
necessary for union operations, resulting from compulsory union fees also 
guaranteed by the state. This is the type of unionism in which the state appears 
and is seen by the workers as a neutral and sovereign entity that organizes 
unionism for the workers. The Labor Party was a kind of parliamentary exten-
sion of state unionism. It was never a mass labor party such as the European 
communist and socialist parties. Its gaucho nucleus, better organized and bet-
ter defined programmatically, is not a typical point on the standard curve of 
its history. It is true that it took the first steps toward becoming a mass labor 
party in the scenario of 1945–1947. If it had succeeded, populism would have 
ceased to exist. However, what was aborted was its own path when the Dutra 
government made it illegal and banished it from the union movement.7
Lulism initially emerged from a dynamization of the union movement that 
reformed the unionism of the state, and in the crisis of the military dictatorship 
it was on the verge of separating itself from this institution. It presented a 
unionist dimension, a typical labor economism, by focusing on economic strug-
gle but one based on the self-organization of the workers and not on a state-
based unionism. However, it did not fail to exhibit from the beginning elements 
of the Brazilian populist tradition—plebiscitary assemblies in the Vila Euclides 
Stadium that did not consider the possibility of discussing proposals for strikes, 
the extreme personalization of Lula’s leadership in strikes, and problems with 
disengaging from the alleged benefits of official unionism. Later, as I have indi-
cated, Lula’s political activity was based primarily on marginal mass workers 
and its populist component became dominant.
The government team of the first Lula period discussed the need for the 
government and/or the PT to organize marginal workers benefiting from the 
income transfer programs (at the time, the Bolsa Família) and offers of goods 
and services but rejected it. Later, as Light for All, the Cistern program, My 
House, My Life, and other programs were introduced, the policy of keeping the 
beneficiaries unorganized remained unchanged. To borrow an expression from 
the journalist Breno Altman, what was achieved was the gratitude of workers 
who were beneficiaries rather than their conscious identification with a pro-
gram of reforms. In contrast to Varguism, Lulism has not been subjected to 
systematic field research on the ideological position of workers of the marginal 
mass who support Lula, particularly their perception of the state, politics, and 
the former president of Brazil. At this point, we have to fill the gaps by deduction 
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from the political practice of agents involved in the relationship—practice 
implies a discourse—and by using the scarce material available.
Lula’s rhetoric as a union leader in the 1970s was that of a reformist and 
combative workers’ union leader. However, especially during his first presi-
dential term and in speeches addressed to popular audiences he began to 
explicitly identify himself with a paternal figure who would protect the (chil-
dren) citizens. There are analyses of his speeches by linguists highlighting this 
component, and there is at least one field study reporting the same results, 
although they are not statistically significant. Perhaps most important, the 
aforementioned Caravan for Brazil provided new and very significant empir-
ical material on this point. The title of the article published on the PT website 
about the experience of the caravan was “For Many Northeasterners, Lula Is 
Known as the Father!”8 In short, these workers were not politically educated 
to rely on their own strengths. What was stimulated with this policy was the 
protective-state fetish.
Lulist neopopulism is the key to understanding the weakness of popular 
resistance to the parliamentary coup that occurred in Brazil in 2016. In the 
struggle against Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment, the leaders and activists of the 
popular movements that organize marginal mass workers such as the Landless 
Workers’ Movement, the Homeless Workers’ Movement, the Movement of 
Those Affected by Dams, and others were a constant and prominent presence 
in street protests. These movements, however, involved very few workers of 
the marginal mass and strove to educate the masses politically and help them 
overcome populist illusions. The large contingent of workers of the marginal 
mass was completely absent from protests against the parliamentary coup. 
Masses deluded by the state fetish do not organize and defend their leaders. In 
fact, they imagine that those leaders are powerful enough to overcome their 
problems alone and expect to be defended by them. Moreover, if the PT or 
Dilma’s government had decided, at the last minute and after noticing the 
increase of the enemy’s power, to appeal to these masses, it would have been 
hard for it to make up for the lost time in which it had left them dispersed and 
politically passive. The marginal mass reappeared in national politics only in 
August 2017, a year after the parliamentary coup, in Lula’s Caravan for Brazil, 
and it reappeared as a mass in Lula’s rallies and campaign stops, receiving him 
with enthusiasm but politically disorganized. Lula visited the nine states of the 
Northeast and dozens of cities. He revitalized Lulism, achieving great popular 
enthusiasm and zero organizational progress. Lulism returned to assert itself 
as neopopulism.
Another important consequence of the fact that Lulist populism was based 
on marginal mass workers was that unionism had very limited participation in 
the fight against the impeachment of the president. This was the result of two 
factors: the peripheral position of the union movement in the social policy of 
the PT governments and the existence of a large group of conservative union 
leaders forged by the structure of state unionism itself. Historical claims of 
unionism, although presented by Lula and Dilma at striking and symbolic 
moments, were ignored by the PT governments, among them the reduction of 
working hours, approval of International Labor Organization Conventions 151 
and 158 (which prevent dismissals without cause and guarantee collective 
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bargaining in the public sector), the end of the welfare factor, restrictive 
outsourcing regulations, revision of the income tax table, and others (Marcelino, 
2017). The environment for union struggle improved greatly as the policy of 
stimulating economic growth reduced unemployment from 13.5 percent in 
2003 to 4.6 percent in 2014, increasing the willingness of workers to fight and 
the number of strikes and greatly improving collective agreements and conven-
tions (Boito, Galvão, and Marcelino, 2015). However, the only important eco-
nomic or social measure directed exclusively to the union movement and in 
response to a demand was the policy of valorization of the minimum wage.
Brazil has 12 union centrals, and when the political crisis threatened Dilma 
Rousseff’s government only 3 of them supported the protests in defense of her 
mandate: the Unified Workers’ Central, the Brazilian Workers’ Confederation, 
and the Intersindical.9 However, this political position produced only material 
and logistical support for the protests. Union centrals lacked the power to 
direct the actions of their member unions, and the large unions refrained from 
participating in the movement against the parliamentary coup. Some of them 
were absent because they feared they could not mobilize their bases for the 
protests. The leader–social-base relationship in state unionism is by definition 
distant, and the right-wing agitation over the corruption of the PT govern-
ments had neutralized sectors of wage earners. Other unions, mainly conserva-
tive ones, did nothing simply because they supported the right-wing 
parliamentary coup against the center-left PT government. An interesting topic 
for research would be a comparison of the union mobilization in defense of 
Getúlio Vargas in 1945, in the so-called Queremist Rally, with the very weak 
union mobilization in defense of Dilma Rousseff in 2015 and 2016.
Any analysis of the weak union and popular mobilization in defense of 
Dilma Rousseff’s mandate must take into account that the government did not 
seek to mobilize the masses in its defense. Dilma Rousseff concentrated her 
resistance mechanisms on the institutions of the capitalist state. She and her 
justice minister, José Eduardo Cardoso, consciously and systematically adopted 
the strategy of confining themselves to legal dispute, trying to show, on the 
basis of technically correct but politically irrelevant arguments, the legality and 
insignificance of the administrative acts that were presented as grounds for the 
president’s impeachment.
Although they established a neopopulist relationship with marginal work-
ers, in contrast to the Vargas governments Lula’s and Dilma’s governments 
cannot be characterized as populist. They were governments of the Brazilian 
internal grande bourgeoisie, the hegemonic group of the bloc in power, and 
populist politics was an important but subordinate dimension of these govern-
ments. Two bourgeois groups were competing for hegemony in the Brazilian 
state power bloc in the period of the neoliberal capitalist model: the internal 
grande bourgeoisie, which combined segments of agribusiness, industry, and 
banking, and the associated bourgeoisie, represented by companies linked in 
various ways with foreign investment in Brazilian capitalism. The Cardoso 
government represented the hegemony of the associated bourgeoisie and inter-
national capital. Lula’s and Dilma’s governments exemplified the internal 
bourgeoisie. It is not my aim to develop these theses here, but the economic, 
foreign, and social policies of these governments justify such claims (Boito and 
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Saad-Filho, 2016). It was possible to implant the hegemony of the internal 
grande bourgeoisie, which was expressed in neodevelopmentalist economic 
policy, because the PT governments built a broad, heterogeneous, and unstable 
political front that supported the rise of this bourgeois group as a hegemonic 
group of the bloc in power. The way in which marginal laborers joined this 
neodevelopmentalist front was through populist politics, but this does not jus-
tify characterizing the PT governments as populist. They were bourgeois gov-
ernments and, specifically, governments of the internal bourgeoisie.
BonaparTism and LuLism
André Singer, inspired by Marx’s classic Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte, says that Lulism is a type of Bonapartism. I consider this characteri-
zation inaccurate (see Boito, 2013b). I have already said what I understand to 
be the political relationship that links Bonapartist leadership to its base: it is the 
fetish of the state based on order. First, the individualization or personalization 
of politics is here, as in populism, a manifestation of statist ideology, and this 
ideology keeps the base of Bonapartist politics politically disorganized, since, 
especially in the political sphere, it is the state and not the workers that must 
act (Bluche, 1981). Second, the longing for order, which is what underlies the 
Bonapartist fetish of the state, is, as I have already indicated, the conservative 
and antipopular feature that distinguishes Bonapartism from populism. 
Bonapartism is, as is well-known, a notion that refers to a kind of bloc in power.
A varied Marxist literature perceives that the bloc in Bonapartist power is 
characterized by a government endowed with ample room for maneuver in 
relation to social classes and one whose politics zigzags between conflicting 
interests. Such governments arise in times of political crisis. The margin for 
maneuver and the strength of government emerge from two factors acting 
together: the “balance of forces in weakness” both between the classes of the 
base and between groups of the ruling class and the government’s reliance on 
popular support. This understanding is presented in The Eighteenth Brumaire of 
Louis Bonaparte (Marx, 1976: 126), where Marx wrote that “the bourgeoisie 
could no longer govern, whereas the proletariat still could not do it,” that “the 
conflict between landownership and capital divided the ruling classes among 
distinct dynastic houses,” and that “Louis Napoleon seems to hover above 
classes, but he represents the largest class in French society: the peasantry.” 
There is one aspect of this conception— the idea that the Bonapartist govern-
ment attends to one and then the other without achieving a coherent policy—
that must be carefully examined. Marx wrote this book in the heat of the 
moment when the government of Louis Napoleon had begun to organize and 
the political crisis had not yet been overcome. The government took measures 
that were sometimes incongruous and not yet stabilized. The subsequent his-
tory of the Bonapartist regime does not fit well into this analysis.
Louis Bonaparte remained in power for two decades and implemented a 
policy for the capitalist modernization of France (Plessis, 1973). Engels then 
made a somewhat different analysis of Bonapartism (Marx and Engels, 1981: 
126). He continued to see it, as in Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire, as government 
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with a wide margin of maneuver in dealing with the ruling classes because of 
the balance of power but said that such governments could use this greater 
autonomy to promote the capitalist modernization of their countries—in other 
words, to implement a coherent economic policy. Engels mentioned the 
Bismarck government as an example. Since then, this concept has been widely 
used in the Marxist tradition. The Japanese state of the Meiji era is considered 
a Bonapartist state, and even in Brazil there is a long tradition of considering 
the Vargas state a Bonapartist state (Demier, 2013). In all these cases this is not 
because such states zigzagged between social classes but because they used 
their greater autonomy to promote capitalist modernization.
Singer considers that the electoral realignment that occurred in the 2006 
presidential election was the starting point of the Lulist phenomenon. As he 
shows, a double movement occurred in that election. While part of the middle-
class electorate moved away from Lula, broad low-income segments approached 
the PT candidate. Lula’s leadership has since become the political representa-
tion of this class, which Singer, following the economist Paul Singer, has called 
the “subproletariat.” Most of this subproletariat is made up of what I have here 
called marginal mass workers. Subproletarians are workers who “offer their 
labor force in the market without finding anyone who is willing to acquire it at 
a price that ensures their continuation under normal conditions.”10 This sub-
proletariat, whose income Singer indicates to be in the range of up to two min-
imum wages, covers 47 percent of the Brazilian electorate, which makes it by 
far the largest group in the country and capable of deciding a presidential elec-
tion. Domestic servants, employees of small enterprises, and workers deprived 
of organizational capacity and pressure are part of it, and therefore, in Singer’s 
view, they lack the capacity to participate in the class struggle. The relationship 
that the PT governments began to establish with this politically disorganized 
social base was a Bonapartist relationship.
The dynamics of the power game in Brazil, according to Singer, were as fol-
lows: Supported by a politically amorphous but electorally powerful base, the 
PT governments practiced arbitration among the fundamental classes to avoid 
the predominance of any one of them in order to promote, in this game of equi-
librium, the interests of the subproletariat, the working-class group represented 
by Lula’s and Dilma’s governments (Singer, 2012: 159, 165, 196, 200, 219). The 
idea of representation here is not the same as that found in Marx’s Eighteenth 
Brumaire. When Marx claimed that Louis Bonaparte represented the peasantry, 
he was pointing to an ideological relationship in which the peasantry imagined 
that Louis Bonaparte’s government would defend the interests of peasants. 
This illusory or ideological representation is implicit in Marx’s general thesis 
that the Bonapartist regime replaced the political power directly exercised by 
the bourgeoisie to secure the economic domination of this class and is explicitly 
developed in Chapter 7 of Marx’s book when he analyzes the peasantry’s rela-
tionship with Louis Napoleon. The illusion of representation was highlighted 
by Nicos Poulantzas (1968) in reviewing Marx’s book and was what allowed 
him to develop the aforementioned concept of the support class, a class that is 
dominated and excluded from the bloc in power but deceives itself about a par-
ticular government or political regime and, for that reason, offers to become its 
support base.
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In Singer’s analysis, alternatively, Lulism removed the subproletariat from 
the influence of the bourgeoisie (Singer, 2012: 44), elevated it to the condition of 
the main force in government power, and carried out the political program of 
that group of the working class, not the political program of the bourgeoisie or 
the working class. According to Singer, the program of the bourgeoisie was 
neoliberalism and that of the proletariat a rupture with neoliberalism, while the 
weak reformism without a break with the established order that was the policy 
of the PT governments was the “complete execution of the program of the sub-
proletariat” (44, 76, 219). Even the fact that the governments of Lula and Dilma 
did not break away completely from the neoliberal model reflected the interests 
and values of the subproletarian social base of those governments (74, 196). 
According to Singer’s analysis, it was as if the state policy of the PT govern-
ments prioritized the interests of the subproletariat, not those of the bourgeoi-
sie or of any other group of that social class:
The democratic trend of the 1980s—a period during which strong reformism 
represented a perspective of the organized working class in the country—
stumbled upon the obstacle of what this book has been talking about from its 
beginning: the vast subproletarian group, the poorest half of the Brazilian 
population, who wished (and desired) and wanted to fit in the capitalist order 
and thrive in it, and not to transform it from the bottom up, because that was 
not within its reach. (196)
The secret of Lula’s success was, based on the background of economic ortho-
doxy, to draw up a policy of promotion of the domestic market focused on the 
less favored group, which, together with the maintenance of stability, corre-
sponds to nothing less than the execution of a complete class program (or that 
of a group of such a class, to be precise). This program was not for the orga-
nized working class, . . . but for the class group that Paul Singer called the 
subproletariat. (76)
In my opinion, the “continuity of Lula’s government with Fernando Henriquez 
Cardoso’s government” with regard to macroeconomic policy . . . [was] the 
means that was used to guarantee the vital element to win the support of the 
poorest: the maintenance of order. (74–75)
The governments of Lula and Dilma, supported by the subproletariat, sought 
to balance the basic classes—the proletariat and the capitalists—because their 
success depended on the fact that none of them have the strength to impose 
their own goals: a strong reformism, which aims at a rapid increase of equality, 
. . . or neoliberalism, which tends to increase inequality, whose losses affect 
workers. (200)
What is the government’s objective when maintaining the balance between 
capital and labor? It is not only about maintaining order, avoiding political 
radicalization, but also about guaranteeing the subproletariat two fundamen-
tal conditions: low inflation and increased buying power. (159–160)
Finally, the platform of the subproletariat that the governments of Lula and 
Dilma have supported. (219)
I have some critical observations to make about this characterization. The 
first is very brief and is only an example: A historical condition generally pres-
ent in the formation of Bonapartist governments and populist governments is 
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a major political crisis, and there was no such crisis in Brazil in 2002, when Lula 
was elected president, It is widely recognized that Lula became president when 
the workers’ and popular movement was, for a few years, in a regressive and 
defensive phase. Of the other observations, two of them refer specifically to the 
relationship of the capitalist state and of the PT governments with the popular 
classes and the other concerns the relationship of this state and these govern-
ments with the ruling classes.
First, Singer overestimates the political power of the subproletariat. To assert 
that the capitalist state prioritizes the interests of a dominated class would at 
least require further development and explanation. In addition, if the heteroge-
neous popular sectors that he groups under this notion are characterized by 
“not being able to participate in the class struggle,” how can one say that they 
have a “program”? When we say that a sector or social class is disorganized, 
we mean that it does not have a political program for participating in particular 
situations. The impoverished and disorganized mass that electorally supports 
PT candidates certainly does this by pursuing certain expectations, but these 
expectations are diffuse. They are not described in a clear and conscious way 
as they would be if they were part of a program, and, moreover, the PT govern-
ments were in charge of organizing these diffuse expectations to create a pro-
gram such as the transfer of income. This program amounted to allowances for 
marginal workers that improved their living conditions, but they were not the 
priority of state policy. If we add, for example, the budget of the Brazilian 
Development Bank for subsidized loans to large national companies and the 
costs of the rollover of the public debt, both directed at a small number of 
Brazilian businessmen and big bankers, the result would be a number a hun-
dred times greater than the resources from the main income transfer program, 
which was aimed at millions of workers. It is necessary to distinguish the bour-
geois groups that make up the bloc in power from the popular stratum that 
merely serves as a support class for a particular government.
Secondly, it is difficult to argue that the subproletariat that has sided with 
Lulism is conservative, meaning that it defends continuing with neoliberalism. 
In Marx’s analysis, the identification of peasants with Louis Napoleon was 
conservative. Peasants wanted Louis Napoleon to restore order because they 
were frightened by news of workers’ and popular insurrections in 1848 and 
1849 in Paris and other French cities. In Brazil today, the subproletariat wants 
income to be redistributed, and this wish is progressive and popular. Singer 
acknowledges this expectation but says that it conforms to a conservative atti-
tude that rejects breaking with the neoliberal order. He is so emphatic in this 
assertion that he ascribes the fact that Lula and Dilma did not break definitively 
with neoliberalism not to the interests of the grande bourgeoisie involved in the 
bloc in power but to the purported conservatism of the subproletariat.
It is true that there is popular conservatism, but in present-day Brazil this 
conservatism has favored candidates who opposed the PT governments and 
did not vote for PT candidates. After all, it was not the whole subproletariat 
that sided with Lulism. As of 2006, Lula had a large majority in this social tier, 
but a significant portion of this tier (a percentage that is disregarded in Singer’s 
analysis) continued to vote for right-wing candidates. If we characterize “Lulist 
subproletarians” as conservatives, how should we characterize the portion of 
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the subproletariat that, yesterday and today, voted or declared its intention to 
vote for right-wing or far-right politicians such as João Dória of the Brazilian 
Social Democratic Party of São Paulo and Jair Bolsonaro of the Social Christian 
Party of Rio de Janeiro?
Singer offers the reader very little to substantiate his thesis of the general-
ized conservatism of the subproletariat and its role in the PT governments’ 
maintenance of neoliberalism. He cites surveys that show the rejection of 
strikes by low-income groups, but I would point out that these same surveys 
also report tolerance of strikes by high-income classes. We must then ask our-
selves whether these two results might have a single cause. In Brazil in the 
2000s and 2010s, public service workers led many strikes, and in most cases 
these were corporate strikes of specific segments fighting for particular inter-
ests. Strikes in public services generated problems mainly for the low-income 
population and not for the high- or very-high-income population. Could this 
not be the explanation? Can this rejection of strikes by the low-income popu-
lation be characterized as conservative? This rejection is no more corporatist 
than the Brazilian strikes of the period that one considers a measure of a 
forward-looking position. Moreover, why would rejection of strikes mean 
support for neoliberalism? A link is missing from this causal chain. Even if 
motivated by conservatism, rejection of strikes could mean another kind of 
interest and aspiration. Indicators that support this thesis are scarce. What is 
certain is that the maintenance of the neoliberal model, simply reformed by 
neodevelopmentalist policy, serves the interests of big companies, and much 
of the bourgeoisie fought and continues to fight for the bases of this model to 
be maintained. It is inappropriate to attribute to those below a political 
responsibility that belongs to those above.
My last observation concerns the relationship of the ruling class with the 
Brazilian state and with the PT governments. To imagine that the govern-
ments of Lula and Dilma were Bonapartist because of the simple fact that 
they made concessions at one time or another to the conflicting demands of 
the existing social forces is to suppose that the capitalist state is a mere pas-
sive instrument in the hands of the dominant class or its hegemonic group. 
In fact, the capitalist state has an active role that places it above the immedi-
ate interests of any particular class or group and enables it to seek an unsta-
ble balance of compromise between existing forces. It is true that the 
capitalist state is the arena of distributive conflict among groups of the bloc 
in power and even among classes of the base, but it is at the same time an 
active actor in this conflict. What characterizes Bonapartism is something 
more than an active state in search of an unstable balance of compromise, a 
stabilizing element of class domination. Bonapartism is a condition in which 
the economic and social policy of the state, considered in its fundamental 
aspects, fails to express the objective interests and also the explicit demands 
of different groups of the bourgeoisie. The economic policies of the govern-
ments of Lula and Dilma addressed, in their fundamental aspects, primarily 
the interests of an internal grande bourgeoisie, and this bourgeois group was 
recognized, at least until the second Dilma government, in the economic 
policy of the PT governments. Not only were its objective interests priori-
tized by state policy but it was politically identified with the PT governments, 
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which, in stark contrast to those of the Cardoso period, created innumerable 
forums for the internal bourgeoisie to express its views.11 In the so-called 
bribe crisis (mensalão) in 2005, the Federation of Industries of the State of São 
Paulo, with Paulo Skaf as president, and the most important national asso-
ciations of the grande bourgeoisie mobilized in defense of Lula’s govern-
ment, dismantling the first attempt at a parliamentary coup d’état, which 
was planned by the Brazilian Social Democracy Party.12
In the period from the first Lula government to the first Dilma government 
it is possible to detect a growing affirmation of the program of economic and 
social policy that we can call neodevelopmentalist.13 It was not a zigzag path 
that would change the rhythm of alterations in the correlation of forces. Lula’s 
first government was marked by important concessions to international finan-
cial capital that neutralized and divided the conservative opposition forces. 
However, foreign policy and the role of the Brazilian Development Bank 
changed to serve the interests of the grande bourgeoisie (Berringer, 2015; 
Bugiato, 2016). In the second term, the neodevelopmentalist profile of the gov-
ernment’s economic and social policy became clear with the creation of the 
Growth Acceleration Program, the anticyclical economic policy measures in the 
context of the international economic crisis, and the establishment of the hous-
ing program My House, My Life. Dilma went even farther in the same direc-
tion. She depreciated the exchange rate, reduced the basic interest rate, pushed 
for a reduction in banking spreads, reduced the primary surplus through vari-
ous means, established new regulations for public purchases that favored local 
production, and implemented protectionist measures. This neodevelopmental-
ism shows that state policy under the PT governments had a clear focus and 
aimed at capitalist development without, however, breaking away from some 
of the bases of the neoliberal model. We can mention the rollover of the public 
debt, which hindered the state’s investment capacity, and trade liberalization, 
which undermined domestic industry. But the downside of this neodevelop-
mentalist economic policy, limited by the demands of the persisting neoliberal 
capitalist model, is explained not by the interests of the subproletariat but by 
the interests of segments of the Brazilian bourgeoisie and international capital 
that under the PT governments lost opportunities but were not eliminated from 
the bloc in power.
noTes
 1. I have presented such a characterization, considering Lulism a neopopulism (Boito, 2003). 
The reemergence of populism in Brazil and Latin America was analyzed in the 1990s by several 
political scientists (see Saes, 1994).
 2. In defining “populism” I will review some of the discussion on this topic that I presented 
in previous works. The debate on Lulism requires revisiting the debate on Varguism and other 
such discussions (Boito, 1982; 2005). Both texts are available for download on the academic net-
works Academia.edu and ResearchGate.
 3. The article is anonymous but is currently attributed to Hélio Jaguaribe (1954). Marxist writ-
ers criticized the definition for formalism and misconceptions (Saes, 1994). An alternative analysis 
is that of Francisco Weffort (1978). Unfortunately, even today, many historians who criticize the 
concept of populism act as if the aforementioned formalistic definition of populism were the only 
one that existed, thus facilitating their rejection of it but contributing not at all to an understanding 
of the phenomenon. Jorge Ferreira (2001), for example, has criticized and rejected the concept of 
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populism and tried to rescue the Vargas heritage with the aim of bringing Brazilian labor closer 
to the former European social democracy. This seems to me unsuitable. The European socialist 
and communist workers’ parties, as mass working-class parties, succeeded in establishing a wel-
fare state in Europe, whereas the Brazilian Labor Party, made up of cadres and dependent on the 
union structure, did not go beyond the achievement of a limited and unequal social citizenship.
 4. Fetishism is not alienation. The similarity between the first of these concepts, included in 
Capital, and the second one, included only in drafts and short texts of the young Marx, is merely 
formal. These are two distinct concepts that correspond to different theoretical problems. The 
concept of fetishism pertains to historical materialism problems, while alienation is related to 
theoretical humanism issues (Boito, 2013a).
 5. The personalistic, authoritarian, and xenophobic political leaderships that proliferate today 
in Europe and the United States cannot, from this perspective, be described as populist.
 6. At this point, I want to point to Nicos Poulantzas’s (1968) concept of the support class, a 
social class that, lacking political organization, serves as diffuse and inorganic support for a gov-
ernment or political regime. It is not part of the bloc in power and can, in a limited way, provide 
support for ideological reasons even though its minimum interests are not fulfilled by govern-
ment policy.
 7. Historians influenced by Thompson’s work rejected the concept of populism because they 
believed that it obscured the fact that in Brazil, from 1930 to 1964, workers struggled to be granted 
labor and social rights. An important example of research with such ideas is the book by Fortes 
et al. (1999). The concern of these authors is fair, but I think the solution is wrong. The concept of 
populism does not assume that the masses do not fight for their interests. It does involve the idea 
that workers under the hegemony of populist ideology can organize and often do so but in order 
to struggle for what they want. What populist ideology precludes is the specific organization based 
on a political party of workers (Saes, 1985: 226–229). Consequently, the positive work of these his-
torians reestablishing Brazilian labor and strikes cannot be considered a valid argument for reject-
ing the concept of populism. In order to do so, it would be necessary to show that the old Brazilian 
Communist Party had succeeded in establishing a mass labor political party in Brazil along the 
lines of the European communist and socialist parties, or that the former Brazilian Labor Party had 
developed the profile of a party based on organized mass action, constant political activity (not just 
during elections), and an active internal life revolving around arguments on policy.
 8. http://www.pt.org.br/para-muitos-nordestinos-lula-e-conhecido-como-pai (accessed 
September 18, 2017). See also the report in the Brazilian edition of El País entitled “If Today I 
Have a Car, a House, and I Can Dress Like This, It’s Because of Lula” and containing the fol-
lowing assertion: “During the tour of the Northeast, the PT politician was called ‘father’ by 
voters, and he asked them to not be discouraged by politics.” https://brasil.elpais.com/bra-
sil/2017/09/03/politica/1504475928_990903.html?rel=mas. (accessed September 20, 2017). 
Walquiria Leão Rego and Alessandro Pinzani interviewed 150 women beneficiaries of Bolsa 
Família in the Northeastern sertão and reported the following results: “A relevant majority of 
interviewees (75 percent) said that the Bolsa Família is a government favor or an action arising 
from the fact that President Lula was poor. . . . Only a few have stated that the government has 
a duty to help the poor and only five have used the word ‘right’” (Rego and Pinzani, 2013: 
87–88). For the purposes of our discussion “favor” and “the government has a duty to help the 
poor” may be the same thing. On the presence of the father figure in Lula’s political speech, 
see Oliveira and Gouvêa (2017).
 9. I mention the defense of the president’s mandate because her economic and social policy 
was indefensible and perceived as such by the workers’ movements. After campaigning for eco-
nomic growth and income distribution and accusing the opposing candidate of trying to imple-
ment a policy of budget cuts and fiscal adjustment, Dilma Rousseff, once in office, betrayed the 
promises of her campaign and implemented a strongly recessive economic policy.
10. This definition is by Paul Singer and André Singer (2012: 77) repeated it.
11. The participation of large Brazilian businesses in advisory bodies for the definition of Lula’s 
economic policy is analyzed in two works by Diniz and Boschi (2004; 2007). Tatiana Berringer 
(2015) analyzes the participation of the business community in determining the foreign policy of 
the PT government.
12. On the support of the internal grande bourgeoisie for Lula’s government during the bribe 
crisis, see Martuscelli (2015). In the second term of Dilma Rousseff (2015–2016), a crisis of political 
150  Latin amEriCan PErsPECtiVEs
representation occurred between the government and the internal grande bourgeoisie. Important 
segments of manufacturing industry and agribusiness, members of this bourgeois group, either 
abandoned the government or turned against it (Boito, 2017).
13. An amalgam of economic policies for stimulating growth through the intervention of the 
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